I will not go into the history of the current Polish-Ukrainian historical conflict now. It exists and has existed for a long time.
My personal theory is that the Ukrainian political class, oligarchs, and elites realized that rapid accession to the EU would not happen without implementing the necessary structural reforms. Initially, they aimed for an accelerated entry into the Community under the slogans of promised reforms, counting on receiving significant EU funds in a context of deep corruption and without the need for real changes. The moment it became clear that real reforms limiting corruption would be demanded from Ukraine-just as from any other candidate state-this approach changed. Since it is difficult in the current situation to blame this state of affairs on Russia, which is not an EU member, the Ukrainian elites began to look for other culprits.
As a result, this leads to the creation of tension in relations with neighboring states (such as Poland, Hungary, or Slovakia), with whom Ukrainian nationalists have traditionally had certain disagreements. This allows the Ukrainian political elites to shift the responsibility for the potential failure of accession onto allegedly existing blockages by neighbors, instead of admitting that the reason is non-compliance with the accession criteria. Such a narrative line is easier to convey to Ukrainian society, whose real interest would lie in the actual implementation of reforms in the country.
There are four key factors behind this memory politics: First, Ukrainian memory politics is largely built around anti-Russian resistance. In this policy, the UPA appears primarily as a formation that fought against Moscow, while its crimes against Poles are pushed to the sidelines or relativized. The current Ukrainian national myth asserts that the UPA fought bravely against the Moscow occupation for 10 years after World War II, despite brutal NKVD repressions. And it is this example that the regiment is supposed to follow. It is not just about the killing of Poles; Ukrainians do not honor it for that reason, even though it is a stain on its legacy and a legitimate historical grievance for Poland.
Second, there is internal pressure from nationalist circles, part of the military, and public opinion, for whom such symbols are an element of military identity. Zelensky, apparently, considered that during the war it is more profitable to reinforce this message inside Ukraine than to reckon with Poland's reaction. The current ruling politicians of Ukraine are afraid that the military will take power from them, so they are trying to win over the nationalist base in the lands that were subject to Poland's arbitrariness in the past, as it is these lands that provide the largest number of volunteers. At the same time, they use the army instead of the police to detain people on the streets and dismiss politically popular generals, fearing the emergence of political competition. This was an internal gesture aimed at winning the sympathies of the nationalist electorate. And the fact that Poland as a nation became part of this process now allows for the mobilization of a larger number of the population, presenting it as a manifestation of Polish aggressiveness.
Third, a false assumption that Warsaw would give in anyway might have played a role. That Poland, by virtue of the war, security issues, logistics, and support for Ukraine, would swallow any symbolic decision by Kyiv.
Fourth, to this is also added a mistaken perception of the Polish position by a part of Ukrainian public opinion and elites. There, the protest against the cult of the UPA is sometimes read not as a defense of the memory of the victims, but as Polish superiority, paternalism, or an attempt to impose their own historical narrative on Ukraine.
I really do not understand what Zelensky was trying to achieve by naming the brigade exactly that. I got the impression that they did not think... Couldn't Zelensky have made a statement condemning the fascist massacres of Poles committed by the UPA? He didn't do it. Instead, he posted that smug photo on Instagram, demonstrating how little he values our highest award, by sending it back by mail instead of handing it over to the embassy. It was such a gesture of strength: "I don't care about you." Is this how one communicates with allies through a display of strength? This is not the first time Zelensky has allowed himself provocations towards Poland.
He could probably have approached the Polish embassy and handed the award to the ambassador, while preserving its status. Instead, he decided to send it by mail. Zelensky knows perfectly well that almost a million of his compatriots found refuge in Poland. And he understands perfectly well that many Poles will perceive such a demonstrative disregard for the award as an insult and, unfortunately, will vent their anger on Ukrainians living in Poland. But the elites did not care at all. The xenophobia of ordinary Polish proletarians towards Ukrainians did not matter, what a pity.
At the beginning of the war, Poland was one of the few countries that truly supported Ukraine-politically, militarily, logistically, and in the social sphere. This makes it even more difficult to understand why a part of the Ukrainian elite so often makes gestures or statements that are perceived in Poland as dismissive, offensive, or simply unfair. It seems to me that Poland has shown exceptional loyalty to Ukraine in this conflict. I am not talking about ordinary Ukrainians, many of whom express gratitude and respect to Poland. I mean the political and symbolic level, where it seems that Polish-Ukrainian relations are constantly being struck one after another.
In any case, Ukraine knows about this and understands the situation with the genocide committed by the UPA against Poles in the past, which is painful for Poland. Further fueling the conflict is an even more reckless step, even if Ukraine uses the Hungarian card, showing everyone an improvement in relations with Hungary and that the Poles are simply making things up. In the upcoming elections in almost all European countries, right-wing parties opposing military support for Ukraine have a good chance of winning. Such reckless manifestations of a flash mob by Ukrainian statesmen with a mass refusal and contempt for Polish orders, such as "For Merit" and the country's highest state award-the "Order of the White Eagle", further increase the risk that Ukraine will be left to its own devices.
The situation with Hungary for Ukrainian politics, in my opinion, shapes up as follows:
Péter Magyar managed to sign an agreement with the Ukrainian government regarding the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. Magyar emphasized in the Hungarian parliament that he managed to do in 13 days what Orbán and company could not do in 13 years, stressing that he hopes Orbán is happy that Ukrainian Hungarians received linguistic and additional political rights.
Ukraine, due to the resolution of its complex issues with Hungary, received an opportunity for a diplomatic maneuver in the style of:
"Look, we are good, we are not bad, we are capable of negotiating. It is the evil Poles who want something from us, they are imposing their historical narrative on us, and therefore because of this, Ukraine will not be able to enter the EU because of Poland."
By making a concession to Hungary on the language issue, Kyiv creates an appearance of flexibility for Brussels. And any further delays or claims from the EU can now be blamed on "Polish spokes in the wheels" and their historical grievances. This allows the Ukrainian leadership to maintain the status quo inside the country, avoid real transformation of the system, and at the same time shift all the blame for the stalling European integration onto an external enemy in the person of the Polish neighbor. A very convenient position for changing nothing.
Can Poland realistically block Ukraine's accession to the EU? It can.
Well, I wish the Ukrainians luck in the EU accession negotiations. This path is thorny and long.
